The proclamation that "Zero Trust is dead," echoed in a July 2025 email, isn't a death knell for a fundamental security philosophy, but rather a stark diagnosis of a widespread implementation crisis. Far from signaling the end of the "never trust, always verify" principle, this phrase marks the end of Zero Trust as a mere marketing buzzword and a collection of disjointed, poorly integrated products. This article argues that the paradigm isn't obsolete; on the contrary, its flawed application has paved the way for a more cohesive and identity-centric evolution.

At the heart of the issue lies a fundamental conflict plaguing modern organizations: the clash between security policy and user productivity. Tailscale's "The State of Zero Trust 2025" report serves as a critical data source, quantifying this tension, revealing a near-universal dissatisfaction of 99% with current access configurations, and an alarming 83% of professionals bypassing security tools to get their work done. These numbers aren't mere statistics; they are symptoms of a deep architectural flaw.

The central thesis of this article is clear: the failure of first-generation Zero Trust implementations demands a fundamental shift from a network-centric architecture to an identity-native security architecture. To support this thesis, we will explore in detail the current state of disconnect between security policies and user practices, critically analyze the concept of Zero Trust and how it has been diluted, define the new paradigm of identity-native security, and present a strategic, phased roadmap for adopting this new approach.

One of the most impactful numbers from the report is that an overwhelming 83% of IT, security, and engineering professionals admit to circumventing corporate security tools to remain productive. This number rises to an even more concerning 87% among developers. This behavior should not be interpreted as a simple user compliance issue or malice; it is the manifestation of a systemic failure in security design. The tools in place are widely described as too slow, brittle, and painful to use.

These deviations from security policy take dangerous forms, including the use of personal devices to circumvent restrictions, the use of unapproved software, and the sharing of credentials. Collectively, these actions create a vast "shadow infrastructure" — an invisible and unmanaged layer of operations that security teams cannot monitor or protect. Paradoxically, the very policies designed to mitigate risk are, in practice, pushing risk into the shadows, where it becomes unquantifiable and far more dangerous.

The Virtual Private Network (VPN) architecture, a cornerstone of perimeter-based security, is identified as one of the main culprits in the current crisis. Data reveals that an impressive 90% of respondents report one or more significant problems with their legacy VPN solutions, with only 10% claiming their configuration "works well." The main complaints are multifaceted, encompassing security risks, latency and speed issues, and high operational overhead.

The analysis reveals a toxic combination of fundamental failures in identity management: slow adoption of identity-based access, flawed offboarding processes, and reliance on manual provisioning. Less than a third of organizations use identity-based access as their primary model. A deeply concerning 68% of professionals admit to retaining access to systems from a former employer after their departure. Most organizations still rely on manual processes to provision access, a method prone to delays, inconsistencies, and human error.

Barriers to modernization are not purely technical. The report identifies that the main reasons for postponing security updates are the "risk of disruption to workflows," conflicting "leadership or organizational priorities," and an "unclear business case" or uncertain ROI. This demonstrates that the problem is deeply rooted in organizational culture, risk aversion, and technical debt.

Identity-native security is an architectural model where authenticated identity — both of users and machines — becomes the new security perimeter and the primary control plane for all access decisions. It is the practical realization of the "never trust, always verify" mantra. All access decisions are mediated through a central identity provider (IdP), such as Azure AD or Okta. Traditional network controls, such as firewalls and IP whitelists, become secondary or irrelevant to the access decision.

Users are granted direct and explicit access to specific applications, rather than broad access to network segments. By default, the network remains "dark" and invisible to users, with resources being revealed only after successful authentication and authorization. Trust is not a one-time event at login. It is a dynamic state that is continuously re-evaluated based on a rich set of contextual signals, such as device health and compliance, geographic location, user behavior, and time of day.

The path forward is not a quick fix, but a strategic, phased transformation. It begins with consolidating identity as the unwavering foundation of security, progresses through the deliberate replacement of legacy technologies like VPNs with granular controls, and culminates in a culture where security is an invisible enabler of productivity, not an obstacle. For security leaders, the message is clear: the era of patching the perimeter is over. The era of building networks on a foundation of verifiable identity and explicit trust has begun.

In conclusion, the statement that "Zero Trust is dead" is a necessary acknowledgement that its first incarnation failed to deliver on its promise. The vast evidence of user dissatisfaction, widespread security bypasses, and critical failures in identity management does not signal the irrelevance of the Zero Trust philosophy, but rather the urgency of its reinvention. The current crisis is not a crisis of concept, but of implementation.